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Abstract
Flood retention areas are being increasingly promoted for flood risk management.
People living in these areas will accept them if their interests are taken into
account. The present study analyses the extent to which farmers' interests were
taken into account in two flood retention projects in Thailand. A feasibility study
was conducted in preparation for the first project which included public participa-
tion. The second project was a pilot project implemented in the same zone at a
small scale. Participants in the public participation process and farmers living in
proposed flood retention areas were interviewed for the purpose of the present
study. Agreement could have been reached between the farmers and the public
agencies concerning the flood retention areas. However, the participation process
did not enable frank discussion about the conditions under which farmers would
accept the project. The second project was designed without public participation
and offered very little compensation to farmers. In countries marked by power
imbalances in water resources management, public agencies may impose flood
retention areas, but the absence of agreements with farmers can reduce the effec-
tiveness of the measure. Reaching such agreements requires challenging the imbal-
anced power relationships between farmers and public agencies.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, increasing attention has been paid world-
wide to nonstructural “soft” measures for flood risk manage-
ment, alone or as a complement to “hard” engineering
approaches (Challies, Newig, Thaler, Kochskämper, &
Levin-Keitel, 2016; Wesselink et al., 2015). Nonstructural
measures do not require investments in heavy infrastructure
but include, for instance, land use planning, flood proofing,
and insurance mechanisms. One of these measures is esta-
blishing controlled flooding areas to limit possible damage
downstream. Compensation schemes are a key to their
acceptance by inhabitants in the long term (McCarthy,
Viavattene, Sheehan, & Green, 2018). When the design of
such schemes is part of a public participation process, this
can result in a shared understanding of the system and better
acceptance by stakeholders of solutions which have been
reached jointly (Cassel & Hinsberger, 2017; Challies
et al., 2016).
In Europe, many projects involving flood retention areas
have been combined with compensation schemes (Enjolras,
Erdlenbruch, Grelot, Kast, & Thoyer, 2008; van Doorn-
Hoekveld et al., 2016; van Staveren, Warner, van
Tatenhove, & Wester, 2014), and the schemes were
designed without public participation only in a few cases
(Ungvári, Kis, et al., 2013). Much more often, in Europe,
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stakeholders are invited to participate in the design of flood
retention areas and of the associated compensation schemes
(Edelenbos, Van Buuren, Roth, & Winnubst, 2017;
Rouillard, Reeves, Heal, & Ball, 2014). The proposed com-
pensation schemes are generally based on payments
(Erdlenbruch, Thoyer, Grelot, Kast, & Enjolras, 2009; Mor-
ris, Beedell, & Hess, 2016), even though farmers may also
be interested in other types of support, such as receiving
technical advice (Holstead, Kenyon, Rouillard, Hopkins, &
Galán-Díaz, 2017).
In Asia, the development of flood retention areas is very
promising. At a time when controversies over the building
of large-scale dams have become the rule rather than the
exception (Kirchherr, 2018), flood retention schemes may
have less disruptive effects on the environment than struc-
tural measures. Storing flood water on farmland has been a
traditional way to collect water for subsequent agricultural
use in Asia (Huang, 2014; van Staveren, 2017; van Staveren,
van Tatenhove, & Warner, 2018). However, only a few
cases of controlled flooding of farmland aimed at protecting
areas located downstream have been reported to date. Sev-
eral of these cases are located in China (Huang, 2014). In
the past, farmers had no say in the matter and the Chinese
government provided no compensation in the case of delib-
erate flooding (Junya & Wright, 2013). More recent cases in
China have involved some compensation (Xia & Pahl-
Wostl, 2012). An experiment in the creation of a flood
retention area was also conducted in Japan but the upscaling
process was difficult due to lack of incentives for farmers to
get involved (Yoshikawa, 2014).
Public participation processes to discuss the design of
flood retention areas and related compensation schemes may
be a challenge in many Asian countries, where water
resources management is in the hands of centralised and
bureaucratic public agencies. Studies have shown time and
again that these agencies are unwilling to relinquish their
power in order to give more space to public participation on
issues such as irrigation management (Molle, Mollinga, &
Wester, 2009; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014). In Asian
countries which have a tradition of state-centred manage-
ment of water resources, the shortcomings of public partici-
pation processes have been repeatedly underlined not only
in the context of the construction of water infrastructures
(Fan, 2016; Lawrence, 2012; Singto, Fleskens, & Vos,
2018), but also in the case of policy design for water
resources management (Shah, 2010). Participatory processes
run contrary to the incentive structure and organisational cul-
ture of centralised bureaucracies (Ricks, 2016). For instance,
in Thailand, the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) is a pow-
erful entity in charge of the management of irrigation
schemes and has also considerable responsibility for water
resources management. The RID has made limited efforts to
take into account the interests of farmers in the way it orga-
nises participatory irrigation management (Ricks, 2015).
The fact is, there are very few reported cases of public
participation in the design of flood retention areas in Asia.
The participatory process studied by Te Boekhorst et al.
(2010) in China was organised by a nongovernmental orga-
nisation. To date, there have been no studies on the extent to
which—whether or not in the framework of formal public
participation processes—Asian public agencies combine
flood retention measures and compensation schemes that
meet the interests of farmers located in the areas that will be
flooded and hence facilitate their acceptance of the project.
The present paper analyses the extent to which farmers'
interests were taken into account in the design process of
two flood retention projects in Thailand. The first project
began in 2015, when the RID undertook a feasibility study
to design large-scale flood retention areas in the central part
of the Chao Phraya River Basin (hereafter referred to as the
Yom-Nan flood retention project). This project included a
formal public participation process. Second, in 2017, the
RID implemented a pilot flood retention project in an area
located for the most part in Bang Rakam District, and which
was covered by the feasibility study. This initiative was
called the Bang Rakam Model 60 and did not include a for-
mal public participation process.
2 | FLOOD RETENTION AREAS IN
THAILAND
2.1 | Local formulation of the concept
In Thailand, the concept of flood retention area became
famous under the initiative of King Bhumibol Adulyadej in
1995. The original idea was to store water during flood
periods in the upper part of the delta area around Bangkok.
Storing water enabled to limit damages in downstream areas
and to later release fresh water to flush away saline water,
which entered from the sea during the dry season. The con-
cept was popularised under the name “monkey cheek,”
which refers to a monkey storing food in its cheeks to be
able to chew it later. This concept was later broadened to
include land located far from the seashore.
In Thailand, flood retention areas are now conceived as
uncultivated or agricultural lands which are intentionally
inundated to protect downstream areas. Residential zones
located within flood retention areas need to be protected
from flooding and roads raised so that flood water does not
submerge them. A system of pumps, canals, and sluice gates
enables the control of water storage and release. Flood reten-
tion areas are located in low-lying lands, where the inhabi-
tants usually face frequent natural floods. However, in a
flood retention area, the artificial flood water can be set to
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be much deeper than the average depth occurring during nat-
ural floods. The artificial floods can also last longer. A flood
retention area has already been implemented in Bang Ban
District, Ayutthaya Province, which is located in the Central
Region of Thailand (Sricharo & Nantiyakul, 2017). Farmers
living in this area were not involved in the decision-making
process concerning the establishment of the flood retention
area (Khamhongsak & Kuaicharoen, 2013). The Thai gov-
ernment praised these farmers for their “sacrifice” when their
land was flooded in order to protect the Bangkok Metropoli-
tan Area (Lebel & Lebel, 2017) but farmers received very
limited compensation.
2.2 | Two flood retention projects
The Chao Phraya River Basin is the largest basin in
Thailand. The Chao Phraya River begins at the confluence
of the Ping and Nan Rivers, and the main tributary of the
Nan River is the Yom River (Figure 1). The Bangkok
Metropolitan Area, which is home to more than 15 million
inhabitants, is located in the delta of the Chao Phraya River
Basin and is particularly exposed to flooding. In the past,
flood management policies mainly focused on building stor-
age reservoirs and embankments (Lebel & Lebel, 2017;
Singkran, 2017). In 2011, a major flood occurred in
Thailand, which affected 13 million people (Poaponsakorn,
Meethom, & Pantakua, 2015). In 2012, the government
earmarked 350 billion baht (approximately US$ 11.3 bil-
lion1) for the implementation of a master water management
plan, which mentioned the creation of flood retention areas.
However, the budget for this plan was cancelled in 2015,
after having been criticised for the lack of public participa-
tion (Khamhongsak & Kuaicharoen, 2013). The plan had
not been designed following the decree on Public Consulta-
tion issued in 2005 by the office of the Prime Minister,
which states that development projects must include public
consultation. Such a cancellation may appear surprising as
in 2014, the Army had taken control of the government and,
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more generally, in the past, public participation in water
resources management has been limited in Thailand
(Kanjina, 2015; Ricks, 2015). However, several social
movements had been able to oppose the building of dams or
the scheduled operation of hydraulic infrastructures
(Foran & Manorom, 2009; Kirchherr, 2018). Therefore, the
government paid importance to avoiding national or interna-
tional criticism of its water policies.
The RID, which is an agency within the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Cooperatives, was made responsible for the
design and operation of flood retention areas. In 2015, the
RID assigned a consortium of consulting companies to con-
duct a feasibility study of the implementation of flood reten-
tion areas. The feasibility study involved the preliminary
identification of flood retention areas, an environmental
impact assessment, an economic assessment, and a public
participation process. The feasibility study was completed in
April 2017.
The low lands considered in the feasibility study are
located in Phichit, Nakhon Sawan, Phitsanulok, and
Sukhothai Provinces (Figure 1). These low lands are also
located in the downstream parts of the Nan and Yom River
Basins. The area considered in the feasibility study encom-
passes several irrigation schemes. In an irrigation scheme,
the RID operates a system of pumps and canals, which
makes it possible to provide irrigation water and to control
flooding (by closing the gates connecting the river to the
canals in case of high flows in the river and, sometimes, by
being able to pump out water from the canals into the river).
In areas located outside irrigation schemes, farmers may
practice rainfed agriculture or they may have their own sys-
tems of canals and pumps, which they operate without the
intervention of the RID.
There is no large reservoir in the Yom River Basin.
Floods are consequently frequent in the rainy season in the
downstream part of this basin and in the area where the Yom
River merges with the Nan River (Sayaphan, 2014). Farmers
living in this region are used to 2-month floods, which usu-
ally occur in September and October. They generally grow
two rice crops per year when they have access to irrigation
and make sure they harvest wet season rice before the flood
period (Thongpan, 2013).
The main objectives of the public participation process
were to raise the awareness of the inhabitants concerning the
Yom-Nan flood retention project and to encourage their
acceptance of the project (TEAM and TWI, 2017). Partici-
pants were consulted on the characteristics of the project and
their proposals were handed to the RID. Thus, the process
amounted to organising public hearings with no pre-
determined impact on decision-making. Because of limited
time and budget, the consortium in charge of the feasibility
study did not organise workshops at village level. Instead,
they created 11 local working teams, which included repre-
sentatives of the inhabitants and staff from administrations
whose responsibilities were related to the project
(e.g., departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and Coop-
eratives). Representatives of the inhabitants were presidents
of the subdistrict administrations,2 subdistrict headmen (who
are nominated by village headmen), and presidents of water
user groups. These local working team meetings were thus
supposed to function as “mini-publics,” which would be able
not only to inform the representatives of a wide range of
stakeholders about the content of the project, but also to pro-
vide recommendations that could later help improve
decision-making (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006).
A series of meetings was organised (Figure 2). First, two
introductory meetings were held (one for two provinces) to
present the concept of a flood retention area and the partici-
patory process, and to select the members of the local work-
ing teams. The local working teams met three times. At each
of these team meetings, participants were informed about
some of the proposed characteristics of the project and
expressed their views. Two meetings concerning the whole
project area were held to present the results of the process to
the representatives of the inhabitants and to the staff of the
public organisations intervening in the project area. Finally,
as part of the environmental impact assessment, two surveys
were conducted, the first of 607 farms and the second of
815 (farming and nonfarming) households. Farmers and
household members were asked about their perception and
acceptance of the project.
The Bang Rakam Model 60 started in February 2017 in
Bang Rakam District (its name being “60” because 2017 is
year 2560 in the Thai calendar) and in neighbouring dis-
tricts. This pilot experiment was implemented on 42,400 ha.
This area belongs to the Yom-Nan irrigation scheme. The
Bang Rakam Model 60 was based on the following proce-
dure. First, the RID delivers water to farmers in April instead
of May, which is usually the case in the Yom-Nan irrigation
scheme. Farmers should start rice cultivation in April and
use short-term rice varieties. Thanks to these changes,
farmers should be able to harvest before the end of July
(instead of in August as they did previously). The fields can
then be flooded for up to 4 months between August to
November.
Meetings were held in February 2017 in Bang Rakam
District to explain the model and in particular the changes to
be implemented in terms of the scheduling of farm opera-
tions (Figure 2). These meetings took place at the subdistrict
level and involved farmers' representatives. The aim of these
meetings was not to get farmers' feedback on the model.
The area defined in the Bang Rakam Model 60 was
flooded from the end of July to November 2017 (first
because of intense rains and then, from mid-August
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onwards, because of the use of the area for flood retention).
The army was present in all meetings and was involved in
the implementation of the model. For instance, they took
decisions with regard to the operation of sluice gates in
cooperation with the RID. In December 2017, the RID
judged the experiment to be a success, as 550 million cubic
metres had been stored during the flood period. The Prime
Minister then declared that a controversial planned dam on
the Yom River, whose main role would have been to man-
age floods, would be cancelled and replaced by the expan-
sion of the Bang Rakam Model (The Nation, 2017).
3 | METHOD
In order to assess to what extent the two projects took
farmers' interests into account, both the processes for design-
ing the projects and their outcomes in terms of meeting
farmers' interests were examined (Maskrey, Priest, & Mount,
2018). In particular, in the public participation process
implemented as part of the Yom-Nan flood retention project,
two axes of analysis were used. The first axis used the
framework proposed by Rowe and Fewer (2000) and asked
those who had participated in the public participation pro-
cess to assess its quality. The second axis used an actor-
oriented approach (Long, 2003) to investigate how issues of
importance for farmers were discussed during the public par-
ticipation process, and to what extent these discussions
influenced the project proposed in the final report of the fea-
sibility study.
Data were collected in two areas included in the Yom-
Nan flood retention project (Figure 1): Chum Saeng District
in Nakhon Sawan Province (in which nine subdistricts were
planned to be included in the project) and Bang Rakam Dis-
trict in Phitsanulok Province (in which five subdistricts were
planned to be included in the project). We interviewed 19 of
the 68 people who participated in the process as representa-
tives of civil society in Chum Saeng District, and 13 of the
33 representatives of civil society involved in the public par-
ticipation process in Bang Rakam District. Respondents
were selected so as to interview at least two people per
subdistrict. We first asked the interviewees about the con-
tents of the discussions during the meetings, with regard to
issues that had been identified as being of importance for
farmers during preliminary interviews. These issues were:
the boundaries of the flood retention areas; the maximum
duration of floods and the maximum water depth when the
areas are used to store flood waters; the amount of financial
compensation; the possibility for farmers to obtain irrigation
water during the dry season as a compensation; and the pro-
tection of roads from flooding.
Second, the interviewed representatives were asked to
evaluate the public participation process based on seven
criteria (selected from Rowe & Frewer, 2000): (1) the repre-
sentativeness of participants; (2) the independence of facili-
tators, that is, there was no bias in the way meetings were
facilitated; (3) the transparency of the process, that is, the
objectives of the meetings were clearly stated; (4) the possi-
bility for participants to access the information needed in
order to understand the issues discussed during the meetings;
(5) early involvement, that is, participation occurred at the
outset of the decision-making process; (6) clear task defini-
tion, that is, participants clearly understood what was
expected of them during meetings; and (7) structured
decision-making, that is, there was a clear method to collect
the opinions and proposals of participants in order to jointly
frame the conclusions of the meetings. The interviewed par-
ticipants were asked to score each of these criteria from
0 (unsatisfactory) to 5 (very satisfactory) and to explain their
assessment. Third, they were asked about the benefits and
drawbacks of the Yom-Nan flood retention project and
whether they supported it (bearing in mind existing uncer-
tainties about its final characteristics).
An additional 43 farmers were interviewed: 20 farmers
from Bang Khian Subdistrict in Chum Saeng District and
23 farmers from Than Nang Ngam Subdistrict in Bang
Rakam District. All the farmers interviewed had no or very
limited knowledge about the Yom-Nan flood retention pro-
ject. Moreover, farmers in Bang Rakam District had experi-
enced the artificial floods which occurred in the framework
of the Bang Rakam Model 60 but they knew very little about
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the characteristics of the Yom-Nan flood retention project.
Thus, in both districts, farmers were invited to give their
general opinion on flood retention areas. Farmers were asked
about: (a) their understanding of the main benefits and draw-
backs of flood expansion areas and (b) whether they agreed
or not with the implementation of flood expansion areas
which would include their farm land. Finally, we inter-
viewed five members of staff of the companies in charge of
the feasibility study and four RID officers at national and
provincial level. All interviews took place between
September 2017 and April 2018.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Issues discussed during the public
participation process
The consulting companies drew up an initial list of areas to
be included in the Yom-Nan flood retention project. During
local team meetings, the facilitators asked participants to add
or remove areas from the list. Some of the participants had
suggested adding areas during the meetings (interviews,
Nakhon Sawan Province, November 2017). They told us
that they expected farmers would receive financial compen-
sation or that being part of the flood retention project would
secure their access to irrigation water in the dry season.
Other participants succeeded in having two areas removed
from the project because they feared the roads would be
damaged (interviews, Phitsanulok Province, November
2017). The total size of proposed flood retention areas
increased from 126,030 ha at the outset of the participation
process to 189,670 ha in the feasibility study report. The lat-
ter comprised 116,380 ha located outside existing irrigation
schemes and 73,290 ha located inside irrigation schemes.
The planned area was home to approximately 58,000
households.
The consulting companies did not initially specify a max-
imum duration for which the proposed areas could be used
to store flood waters (interview with staff of consulting com-
panies and with participants in Phitsanulok and Nakhon
Sawan Provinces, November 2017). In the reports of the
local working team meetings, the proposed maximum
duration—based on averaging the participants' proposals—
did not exceed 2 months. However, the feasibility study
report did not conclude with a proposal concerning the dura-
tion. Staff from the consortium originally proposed a maxi-
mum flood water depth of 1.5 m above soil level in
agricultural land (information from local team meeting
reports). Members of local working teams—surprisingly—
proposed to increase this depth (interview with participants
in Nakhon Sawan Province, November 2017). Eventually,
the reports of the local working team meetings mentioned
that the proposed maximum flood water depth (which was
also calculated for each local team by averaging the partici-
pants' proposals) was between 1.6 and 1.8 m.
The consortium adjusted the project design to conform
with the new proposed maximum water levels. As a result,
the proposed project in the report of the feasibility study
should be able to store 2.049 billion cubic metres (1.326 mil-
lion cubic metres in areas outside irrigation schemes and
723 million cubic metres in areas within irrigation schemes).
This report also stated that the system of gates, which would
be installed in areas included in the project, would be used
to protect farmers from “small floods,” that is, those which
corresponded to a return period of less than 5 years. In all
local team meetings, participants insisted that flood water
should not submerge roads. Local working teams identified
the roads that should be raised as part of the project.
Access to irrigation water during the dry season was a
key issue for many farmers in the region, for both those
located outside irrigation schemes and those located inside
these schemes. All 43 farmers we interviewed said that they
did not receive sufficient irrigation water during the dry sea-
son. During local team meetings, representatives of farmers
located outside irrigation schemes said several times that
they would accept the project of flood retention areas in
exchange for receiving irrigation water during the dry season
(interviews with presidents of water user groups in Nakhon
Sawan and Phitsanulok Provinces, November 2017). The
staff from the consortium and from the RID did not explic-
itly refuse their proposals during the meetings, but in fact
the RID had not planned to provide irrigation water during
the dry season to areas outside irrigation schemes, as a form
of compensation (interview with staff from the central office
of the RID, April 2018).
In Thailand, farmers can obtain financial compensation
in the case of natural floods based on a rate defined at
national level, which amounted to 6,950 baht per ha in 2017.
However, in 2016, no specific decree had yet been issued
for the provision of financial compensation in flood reten-
tion areas, which can be flooded intentionally. During the
local working team meetings, facilitators asked the partici-
pants to make proposals for financial compensation if farm
land was flooded before the rice harvest (discussions did not
cover compensation if flooding occurred after the rice har-
vest). Participants said that the compensation should include
both production costs and net benefits, however, no specific
value was discussed (interviews with participants in Nakhon
Sawan and Phitsanulok Provinces, November 2017). The
feasibility study report actually mentioned the results of the
survey conducted as part of the environmental impact
assessment. In this survey, farmers were asked how much
they would accept as a financial compensation if their rice
field, already four-months old, was flooded. The report
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proposed the average of farmers' answers, which was 28,650
baht per ha. In the feasibility report, production costs were
estimated at between 26,800 and 34,400 baht per ha in 2016
(without taking the possible cost of rented land into account,
which was estimated at between 6,000 and 12,000 baht per
ha) and net profits were estimated at between 10,400 and
14,500 baht per ha. Therefore, the proposed value of 28,650
baht per ha is actually lower than production costs plus net
profits, which range between 41,300 and 56,800 baht per ha.
Eventually, the feasibility study report included proposals
concerning some of the characteristics of the project which
could negatively affect the farmers (the location of flood
retention areas and flood depth) and it included a list of
roads to be raised as part of the project. However, the report
did not include proposals that could be seen as positive from
the farmers' points of view. The report did not mention the
possibility of access to irrigation water during the dry season
as a form of compensation. It acknowledged the need to pay
compensation but it did not conclude with a concrete
proposal.
4.2 | Participants' assessment and farmers'
acceptance of the project
Figure 3 shows participants' assessment of the quality of the
public participation process. Participants gave high scores to
the independence and transparency criteria. However, sev-
eral participants believed that the RID had already made key
choices, for instance concerning the areas that would be
included in the project or the fact that the project would be
implemented irrespective of the local actors' points of view.
Consequently, they generally gave a medium score for the
“early involvement” criterion. Representatives gave a low
score for the “structured decision-making” criterion because
the consultants usually recorded the participants' remarks but
no collective decision was reached.
The participation process had other limitations. Six of the
representatives interviewed had only an elementary education
level. They had difficulty understanding the information pro-
vided during the meetings. Moreover, they did not dare to
ask questions during the meetings. Because most representa-
tives of inhabitants did not fully understand the project, they
did not pass on information about the project to their constitu-
encies (interviews with village headmen and presidents of
water user groups in both provinces, November 2017).
Table 1 shows the farmers' assessments of flood retention
areas and representatives' assessments of the Yom-Nan flood
retention project. Seven farmers disagreed with having their
land included in a flood retention area as they considered
floods would damage the rice harvest. Four farmers agreed
with such a project as they assumed that they would be able
to access irrigation water during the dry season in exchange
for being part of the project. The majority of farmers did not
have sufficient information on flood retention areas to form
an opinion about them. The table also shows that the repre-
sentatives had a much more positive view of the Yom-Nan
flood retention project than the farmers had of flood reten-
tion projects in general.
The feasibility study report mentioned that 97.9% of the
815 household members surveyed agreed with the Yom-Nan
flood retention project. This report concluded on the wide
support of inhabitants for the project. However, in reality,
the inhabitants' real acceptance can be called into question,
as most farmers we interviewed in the present study did not
have a sufficiently clear idea on flood retention areas to have
an opinion about the project.
4.3 | The Bang Rakam Model 60
In the Bang Rakam Model 60, the RID considers that, since
farmers should harvest rice before their farmland is flooded,
they should not receive financial compensation. However, in
2017, the RID supported some agricultural extension activi-
ties in cooperation with other departments of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Cooperatives, such as the promotion of
short-term rice varieties of good quality and certification of
good agricultural practices (interview with staff from the
RID office for the Yom-Nan irrigation scheme, February
2018). During the flood period, farmers are supposed to
have an income from fishing, which was actually a major
source of income during the rainy season 40 years ago (the
dykes of the Yom-Nan irrigation scheme were built between
the 1980s and the 2000s).
All the farmers interviewed for the present study told us
they had no say in the design and implementation of the
Bang Rakam Model 60. One farmer stated that “the Army
told me that they will put water in our field” (interview with
a farmer in Than Nang Ngam Subdistrict, November 2017).
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FIGURE 3 Assessment by representatives of inhabitants of the
quality of the public participation processNote: Assessment based on a
scale ranging from 0 (unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied)
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Farmers had a negative view of planting the rice crop in
April because rainfall in that month was much lower than in
May and they would consequently need to pump more irri-
gation water. Farmers also pointed out that they had neither
fishing equipment nor the necessary fishing skills. They did
not succeed in earning a living from fishing during the flood
period in 2017 (interview with farmers in Than Nang Ngam
Subdistrict, November 2017). Ultimately, in Bang Rakam
District, there was a disconnection between the characteris-
tics of the project that emerged after the public participation
process and the characteristics of the Bang Rakam Model
60. In particular, representatives of inhabitants had been
invited to discuss compensation fees during the participation
process but in the end, no financial compensation was
included in the Bang Rakam Model 60.
The feasibility report generally gave higher priority to
areas located outside existing irrigation schemes for the
implementation of flood retention areas than to those located
inside irrigation schemes. The reason was that the potential
for water storage was higher in the former. However, in
2018, following the Bang Rakam Model, the RID
implemented flood retention areas covering a total of
61,120 ha in 10 areas located inside irrigation schemes in
Thailand. On the other hand, there was no further advance-
ment in the Yom-Nan flood retention project.
5 | DISCUSSION
5.1 | From weaknesses in the participatory
process to power imbalances
Some weaknesses were apparent in the public participation
process setup for the design of the Yom-Nan flood retention
project, such as the limited number of meetings, the absence
of participants' capacity building and unclear linkage with
decision-making. These weaknesses led to limited discussion
with regard to the types of compensation about which the
RID and the farmers could agree.
Despite these shortcomings, farmers did not take the ini-
tiative to express their interests or their disagreement with
the participation process, thereby underlining the farmers'
limited capacity to negotiate with the RID. First, farmers in
irrigated schemes were highly dependent on the RID for the
allocation of irrigation water. Second, water user groups in
the study area were weak and the official representatives of
the inhabitants in the process did not always give priority to
the interests of their constituencies. This was particularly
clear in several of the local working team meetings during
which representatives proposed expanding the flood reten-
tion area and increasing the maximum flood water depth,
even though there was at that time no obvious benefit for
inhabitants to be part of the project. The fact is, presidents
of subdistrict administrations and headmen are elected by
the inhabitants and are not government officers. On the
other hand, they receive a salary from the government and,
in official meetings, they wear the same uniforms as gov-
ernment officers. Many of these presidents of subdistrict
administrations and headmen tend to behave like govern-
ment officers (Thepkhachon, 2010) and thus give priority to
what they believe are the priorities of the government.
Eventually, the “mini-publics” that the local working teams
aimed to be, had limited impacts in terms of building the
capacities of representatives of local inhabitants and in
terms of influencing decision-making. They mainly turned
out to be a way to give legitimacy to the flood retention
project.
TABLE 1 Assessment of flood retention areas by the farmers and the representatives interviewed
Farmers (N = 43) Assessment of flood
retention areas in general
Representatives (N = 32) Assessment
of Yom-Nan flood retention project
Main benefits Number of respondents stating benefits
Reduced floods for people located downstream 0 8
Possibility to fish during the flood period 3 1
Possibility to receive financial compensation 0 5
Provision of irrigation water during the dry season 6 12
Main drawbacks Number of respondents stating drawbacks
Negative impacts on houses and rice fields 16 13
No possibility to get income during the flood period 1 1
Acceptance of the project Number of respondents
Disagree 7 13
Agree 4 19
Not enough information to form an opinion 32 0
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Thus, the relationship between farmers and public agen-
cies in Thailand appears very different from that in Europe,
where the relationship is generally more balanced. European
farmers have more political power and farmers' organisa-
tions and unions are much stronger. As a consequence, some
farmers were actively involved in the negotiation over flood
retention areas (Roth & Winnubst, 2014) or even refused
them (Thaler, Löschner, & Hartmann, 2017).
5.2 | The forced implementation of flood
retention areas…another fragile “short-cut”
Calls for implementing irrigation management transfer
around the world have been based on the premise that such
reforms could have positive outcomes for both farmers and
for the public agencies in charge of the management of irri-
gation schemes (Rap, 2006). However, in many Asian coun-
tries, centralised irrigation agencies did not genuinely
negotiate with farmers about the scope and content of
reforms to transfer irrigation management (Mukherji et al.,
2009). They forced reforms on the farmers, usually trying to
implement them in such a way that would not reduce their
own power. This “short-cut” has been put forward as one
explanation for the mediocre performance of these reforms
(Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014).
Similarly, on paper, flood retention areas in Thailand
may be the subject of win–win agreements, which involve
not only farmers and the RID, but also the many stake-
holders located downstream who will benefit because future
floods will be less extensive in downstream areas. However,
the choice made in 2018 to focus on a top-down and non-
negotiated implementation of the Bang Rakam Model
appears to be a “short-cut” to fast-track the development of
flood retention areas without negotiating the scope and con-
tent of this measure with farmers. There are several explana-
tions why the RID considered that the Bang Rakam Model
could be implemented on a large scale much more easily
than the Yom-Nan flood retention project that was the sub-
ject of the feasibility study. First, many farmers located out-
side irrigation schemes produce rainfed rice and would be
negatively affected by artificial floods because they cannot
change their sowing dates. However, by mid-2018 no regu-
lation had been issued at national level to enable the pay-
ment of financial compensation in the case of controlled
flooding. Second, the Bang Rakam Model 60 model avoids
the costly building of the infrastructure which would be
needed for the development of flood retention areas outside
irrigation schemes. Third, the RID considered that since no
infrastructure was to be built, there was no need for a formal
public participation process. Fourth, officers from the RID
declared they had more legitimacy to undertake top-down
initiatives in irrigation schemes where they delivered
irrigation water to farmers free of charge (interviews with
staff of the RID office for the Yom-Nan irrigation scheme,
November 2017).
Thus, the Bang Rakam Model avoided lengthy negotia-
tion with farmers about possible compensation associated
with the development of flood retention areas. In the end,
the RID considered flood management a new “hydraulic
mission” (Molle et al., 2009), which required no changes in
the way it interacted with farmers.
However, the Bang Rakam Model 60 faced uncertainties
and thus appeared as a fragile short-cut. First, in 2018, there
was no specific legal framework for this model, in particular, no
regulation had been issued to force farmers to start growing dry
season rice in April and to harvest it before August. Second, if
land is flooded for 4 months, farmers have only 8 months to
complete two rice crops, which requires a tight agenda. There-
fore, in the absence of some form of compensation, farmers
located in irrigated schemes may eventually oppose the use of
their land for flood retention. Third, simulations run by
Jamrussri and Toda (2017) showed the limited impacts of the
Yom-Nan flood retention project on the flood patterns under the
hypothesis that the project would enable the storage of one bil-
lion cubic metres of water. Thus, implementing flood retention
areas only inside irrigation schemes located in the downstream
part of the Yom and Nan River Basins (involving a planned
stored volume of 723 million cubic metres) could have limited
impacts on the global patterns of flood expansion in the Chao
Phraya River Basin.
In countries marked by power imbalances between farmers
and the public agencies responsible for water resources man-
agement, the agencies may be tempted to implement flood
retention areas by force without paying attention to farmers'
interests. However, if the public agencies attempt to implement
such areas without paying genuine attention to farmers' inter-
ests, the development of flood retention areas may have the
same mediocre and fragile results as the reforms designed to
transfer irrigation management. The risk is that the concept of
flood retention areas becomes another item on the already long
list of concepts for water resources management which:
(a) were successful in a limited number of cases, and (b) were
nevertheless immediately heralded as a promising solution for
the whole world; and (c), which at best, had limited positive
outcomes—often because of problems that were actually not
related to the concept per se—in many other cases (Shah,
2010; Shah, Makin, & Sakthivadivel, 2001).
6 | CONCLUSION
The development of “monkey cheeks” is becoming a key
component of water resources management policies in
Thailand. However, opportunities for agreements between
farmers and the RID were not discussed in detail and
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exploited in the public participation process conducted dur-
ing the feasibility study and in the Bang Rakam Model 60.
The public participation process was more than just a “failed
encounter”: it actually led to a biased interpretation of
farmers' positions toward the project. The decision of the
RID to move forward with the implementation of flood
retention areas without paying attention to farmers' interests
may enable the rapid implementation of this measure in the
short term, but equally may jeopardise the success of the
measure in the longer term.
In countries with a tradition of state-centred water man-
agement, how to set up processes to genuinely take into
account the interests of rural inhabitants, and especially
those of farmers, in the design of flood retention areas is still
an open question. Well-structured public participation pro-
cesses that meet quality criteria is one step forward. How-
ever, on their own, such processes are unlikely to be
sufficient to identify and reach agreement among stake-
holders, unless they are accompanied by the empowerment
of rural inhabitants in their relationship with public agencies.
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